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WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF DUPLICATE COVERAGE ON THE
DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE IN GERMANY?
M. H. VARGAS AND M. ELHEWAIHI
Abstract. Duplicate coverage involves those individuals who hold public
health insurance, and purchase additional private coverage. Using data from
the German Institute for Economic Research, we try to investigate the impact
of duplicate coverage on the demand for healthcare (measured in number of
visits to doctors). Given the simultaneity of the choices to take out additional
private health insurance coverage, we estimate a negative binomial model to
measure this impact. We also estimate a a Full Information Maximun Loglike-
lihood (FIML), known as Endogenous Switching Poisson Count Model and we
compare these results with the standard maximum log likelihood (ML) estima-
tors of the negative binomial model. The Results show that, there is a positive
difference on the level of health services demanded when there is a duplicate
coverage. We found also that there is evidence to think that in Germany there
is a feedback between duplicate coverage and the demand of health services.
1. Introduction
The German health system is a two-tier system. While around 86 percent of the
population is covered by the public health insurance (also called statutory), about
11 percent is covered by the private health insurance (PHI). The approximately
remaining 3 percent is covered by other governmental insurance schemes (such as
military and police officers) [2].
Contributions to the (SHI) sector depend on income, while in the (PHI) sector
they depend on individual health risks. In general, individuals have the possibility
to obtain healthcare for free through the statutory insurance sector, alternatively
they can pay for healthcare services or purchase (PHI), in particular, for services
that are not completely covered by the public insurance such as psychological and
some dental care.
The statutory insurance is compulsory for employees, whose gross annual income
does not exceed 42,740 Euro (is called income ceiling limit and changed every year).
Tenured civil servants, self-employed and employees whose gross annual income is
above the income ceiling limit are allowed to switch to the private insurance sector
[4].
Renumeration of physicians shows some difference between the two insurance
sectors. Although the fee-for-services are quite the same within both sectors, physi-
cians are allowed to charge up to 3.5 times if an individual holds private insurance
policy and the health problem is complicated [13]. This motivates physicians to
first serve the privately insured individuals. Individuals seek private coverage for
several reasons; 1) overcome the restrictions that are put by the statutory insurance
sector such as limited choice of doctors 2) avoid longer waiting times and lists 3)
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the perceived quality of both sectors are different. Some individual perceive com-
fortable waiting rooms and the friendly treatment of medical personal as better
quality.
Studying health insurance and the demand for health services is an interesting
and challenging issue. Five decades ago, Arrow [1] came up with the problem of
moral hazard, a phenomenon arises, when an individual does not bear the conse-
quences of his/her actions He stated that, an insurance systems without incentives
to providers and users to seek low-cost services were going to increase the expendi-
ture of health services.
A decade later, Grossman[9] studied the demand for health, he found evidence of
influence of individual characteristics on the demand for healthcare. Gary Becker
reiterated Grossman’s conclusion (health capital), he found that, more educated
individuals invest more in their health capital and for this reason they will demand
lower quantity of health services when they become older. Cameron et. al. [3]
modeled the interaction between insurance and the demand for health services us-
ing a two periods model, they argued that, the insurance choice was determined by
the expected level of future healthcare consumption. Vera-Hernandez[18] extended
the Cameron’s model for investigating just the impact of duplicate coverage, using
a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) he found a positive impact of the du-
plicate coverage on the demand and endogeneity when he analyzed a sub-sample
of household heads.
In Germany, Pohlmeier et. al.[12] introduced a negative binomial distributed
hurdle model that, specifies two stages of the decision-making process of demand
for healthcare.
They concluded that, while in the first stage, it is the patient who decides whether
to visit a physician or not, in the second stage, it is the physician, who determines
the number of subsequent visits. Jochmann [11], used a random effects model
specified in a semiparametric Bayesian to analyze the demand for health services,
they found a positive effect of the additional coverage on the demand of the health
services. They did not consider the endogeneity that emerges in the duplicate
coverage.
Using econometric tools, this study aims to figure out what kind of impact does
the duplicate coverage have on the number of visits to doctors.
This paper is divided into seven sections; the second section discusses the relevant
features of the German healthcare system in general, and the health insurance in
particular. It gives also a short summary of the study data. Section three describes
the mathematical framework that stands behind the choice of the econometric mod-
els. Section four addresses the econometric models. Section five presents the study
variables that are included in the analysis. And finally, the last section is designed
for the presentation and discussion of the results.
2. The German health care system
Over the last two decades, the German healthcare system has passed for several
reforms. The period between 1977 and 1983, had witnessed reform acts that were
aiming to contain spending on health sector [10]. In 1989, a new reform act was
implemented, this act aimed among other things at extending the opt-out option.
By passing this act, blue-collars whose income is above the income ceiling were
eligible to opt out of the statutory insurance sector. A further reform act came
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Table 1. Population according to the type of health insurance
coverage (2000)
Type of health insurance
SHI 88.35%
PHI 9.35%
Others 2.01%
No coverage 0.23%
No answer 0.06%
Federal statistical office 2003
into force in 1993, the core points of this act were cost-containment and enhancing
efficiency. The cost-containment has been emphasized by increasing co-payments
and the introduction of fixed budgets. The cost-containment policy was also among
the aims of other reform act which passed in 1997, this involved more co-payment
in addition to exclusion of some rehabilitative care benefits. In 1999 and 2000,
the government released another decree which forced sickness funds (the operating
body of the statutory insurance sector) to global budget (to spend what they have
collected from the contributions of the insured individuals). However, these reform
acts have not contributed to controlling escalating costs of health care.
As a response, the sickness funds were obliged to increase the contribution rates
(from 13.6 to 14 percent between 2000 and 2003). Moreover, by 2004 a new reform
act has been passed, in which patients have to make co-payment. Patients have to
pay 10 Euros each three months for visit to general practitioner and for specialist
if they choose to go without a referral from general practitioners.
Regulations and membership of the (SHI) are set up by the Social Code Book
(SGB V), which determines the individual groups who are entitled to join the
(SHI) and the services package. The total number of the sickness funds was 136 ,
of which the regional sickness funds (5), the company-based sickness funds (110),
guild-sickness funds (9), substitution sickness funds (9), and three other funds.
Generally, there is marked difference among these sickness funds; the only slight
difference is the contribution rate and the nature of additional health services.
Membership in the (SHI) is either compulsory or voluntary. It is compulsory
for employees whose income is below the income ceiling (42.750 Euro per year,
called in German Beitragsbemessungsgrenze), unemployed, students, retirees and
agriculturists. Family members of insured individuals such as unemployed wives
and children are insured for free.
Eligible for the private health insurance coverage are each person who does not
fit under the eligibility criteria of the (SHI) sector. Such as self-employed, civil
servants and employees whose income is above the income ceiling limit. Like the
(SHI) payments for the statutory coverage is also equally divided between employers
and employees. Contracting with the private sector is individually determined,
that means the more healthcare services you contract, the higher is the premium .
Premiums are also dependant on individual’s age at entry, and some money of the
premium are being saved for later.
The provision of health care services in the private insurance sector functions on
reimbursement base. That means, when an individual goes to doctor he gets a bill,
he can either send this bill directly his insurance company, or pays the costs directly
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and getting reimbursed by own insurance company. A private insurance company
can decide on the insurance of individuals and the scope of health problems. That
means each insurance company when contracts an insurance policy, it can exclude
previous health problems from the coverage, and therefore send individuals to med-
ical check up.
3. Health services demand and duplicate coverage demand
In this section we develop a small microeconomic model for to analyze the in-
teraction between the demand for health services and the duplicate coverage. We
based the model in the following expression
(1) ht+1 = H((1− δt)ht, It)
that means that the health stock at time t+ 1 depends on the stock at the past
period ht, some natural depreciation δt (caused i.e. by the age meaning older less
health) and some investment in health (for example sports, good food, preventive
and curative medical care), this three elements are carried to the next period using
a transformation function H, function that we will recognize as the Health Function
Production[9], for now we will suppose that is increasing and strictly concave in its
two arguments.
Unfortunately (1) can be affected at least for two uncertainty factors, the first one
the fatality (accidents, diseases, shocks in the individual’s health) and the second
the effectiveness of treatments, incorporate this factors imply transform (1) in
(2) ht+1 = H((1− δt)ht + ǫ, Itµ)
Where ǫ and µ are random variables with E[ǫ] = 0 and E[µ] = 1, ǫ represents
the uncertainty related to the determinants of health status and µ represents the
effectiveness of the medical care[5].
Now instead of considerer a many periods model we analyze the situation only
in one period of time1 subdivided in two moments2 , at t = 0, the individual know
his/her current level of health (h0), but, he doesn’t know the level of health through
the period and neither the final level of health at the end of the period (h1).
We assume that the individuals have an compulsory health insurance that covers
a limited set of health problems and for covered the other relevant issues they need
to buy a duplicate coverage (supplementary insurance coverage 3). At the very
beginning the individual needs to decide about this insurance policy (to buy or not a
duplicate coverage). In some point (τ = 1) during the period the individual realizes
his/her level of health (pre-treatment level of health h) and decides how much
healthcare he/she wants[3], [8](see Figure 1) based in his/her budget constraint
and preferences.
The individual wants to maximize a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function
U(c, h1) where c is a composite consumption good and h1 is the final health status.
We assume that U has the standard property that utility is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in both arguments (U1.U2 > 0 and U11, U22 < 0).
1The period begins at t = 0 and finishes at t = 1
2The first moment begins at τ = 0 and ends at τ = 1 and the second moment begins at τ = 1
and ends at τ = 2
3Supplemental health insurance is a type of insurance policy designed to cover the gaps that
the regular/compulsory health insurance may have.
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τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2
h0 h h1
Insur. Decision Medical Care Decision
Figure 1. Decisions schedule and information
The individual chooses the insurance policy (take a duplicate coverage dc = 1
or not take it dc = 1), the level of health care v (i.e. visits to the doctor) and the
level of c in order to maximize U(c, h1) .
We assume the existence of a co-payment k > 0 and a price pv > 0 for each visit
and if the individual decides to take a duplicate coverage he pays a premium P ,
then, if we suppose that the income of the individual is Y , he faces the following
budget constrain
(3) Y − dcP = c+ v [(1− dc)pv + k]
Because the individual takes decisions (dc, v) in a sequential form we can solve
the problem backwards, that means that given level of pretreatment health(h¯) and
the insurance policy (d¯c) we can find a expression for the demand of health care
V 4 and by using this expression we can find the demand for health insurance DC.
At time τ = 1.
Then, given a insurance policy (d¯c) and a health status (h¯) the individual’s
problem is
(4) max
V
U
{
Y − d¯cP − v [(1− d¯c)pv + k] , H˜((1− δ(A))h¯, v)}
Notice that in (4) instead of h1 we used H˜((1− δ(A))h¯, v)5 where A is a vector
of characteristics of the individual (like age, gender and others that determine the
deterioration of the health of the individual), because the individual evaluates his
own health at τ = 1 we assume that there is not unexpected shocks, that means
epsilon = 0.
using the solution V (Y, h, dc,A) at the moment τ = 0, we find the following
expected utilities corresponding to the choices dc = 1 and dc = 0
U˙ =
∫
U {Y − P − kV,H((1− δ(A))h0 + ǫ, V )}Fǫ(ǫ|Z) dǫ(5)
U¨ =
∫
U {Y − (pv + k)V,H((1− δ(A))h0 + ǫ, V )}Fǫ(ǫ|Z) dǫ(6)
where we had assume that
(7) h1 = H((1− δ(A))h0 + ǫ, V )
4We use V for denotate the demand of health care and v for the quantity of health care, the
same for DC and dc
5
H˜ acts in this case as a transformation of the health level at τ = 1 to the time τ = 2
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We also assume that ǫ is a random variable with cumulated distribution F (ǫ|Z)
where Z is a vector of variables that determines the likelihood of occurrence of
health shocks (fatalities)[18].
Because dc take only two values, the choice of DC is make it in base to a simple
comparison between the expected utilities in the two cases, then DC(Y, h0,A,Z) =
1 if U˙ ≥ U¨ and 0 if it not the case.
4. Econometric methods
In this section we analyze maximum log likelihood (ML) methods for to study
the impact of the insurance policy DC (duplicate coverage)on the demand of health
care V (measured as number of visits to the doctor). Because V = 1, 2, 3, · · · we
can use methods of count variables, then at first time we describe the basic ideas
behind the method for a single equation and afterward we extend this method for
deal with the endogeneity of DC. .
Now we will assume that we have a sample of size N and we assign an index
i = 1, . . . , N for to represent the data of the individual i, now let Vi the dependent
count variable (in our case the number of visits), a difference of linear model in
count models we are interested in the probability that the count (Vi) assumes a
given value n = 1, 2, 3, · · · this probability is f(Vi|Ψ,x1i,DCi) (probability density
function p.d.f.), x1i it is a vector of explanatory variables andDCi it is the duplicate
coverage index variable.
The ML procedure find the set of parameters Ψˆ that maximizes
ℓ(Ψ) =
N∑
i=1
ln f(Vi = n|Ψ)
different kind of densities give different kind of models. The Poisson model is based
on the assumption that Vi has a Poisson distribution
(8) f (Vi|ΨP ,x1i,DCi) = exp(−λi)λ
Vi
i
Vi!
where λi = exp(θDCi + x
′
1iβ), and Ψ = (δ, β) is the set of parameters.
A more general model that the Poisson model is the Negative Binomial model
(NB) that results of assume that Vi is distributed under a Negative Binomial dis-
tribution
(9) f(Vi|Ψ,xi,DCi) = Γ(α
−1 + Vi)
Γ(α−1)Γ(1 + Vi)
(
α−1
α−1 + λi
)α−1(
λi
α−1 + λi
)Vi
where λi = exp(θDCi+x
′
1iβ) and Ψ = (α, δ, β) is the set of parameters parameters
of this model.
Notice that in both models the conditional mean specified is
(10) E(Vi|Ψ,x1i,DCi) = exp(θdci + x′1iβ)
Under suitable assumptions this models can be estimated using the ML method,
but as consequence of the theoretical analysis in the previous section there is the
possibility of endogeneity between the number of visits (Vi) and the duplicate cov-
erage index variable (DCi), if this is the case ML estimators are no more reliable
and we need to use methods of simultaneous equations. At date there are a good
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quantity of methods for to deal with the problem of endogeneity, a good survey of
this methods can be found in Schellhorn [15], Romeu et al. [14] and Terza et al.
[17].
An natural solution for our case is the extension of the basic count model to
a count model with a endogenous switching (ES)[16] that implies to analyze the
p.d.f. f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ζ1i) where Γv is a set of parameters and the variable DCi
is the bivariate switching variable, such that
(11) DCi =
{
1 if x′2iγ + ζ2i > 0
0 otherwise
where ζ1i and ζ2i are variables jointly normal distributed with mean zero and
covariance matrix
Σ =
[
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
]
Under this assumptions
(12) f(Vi,DCi|Γ,x1i,x2i) =
∫
∞
−∞
f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ζ1i)×
× [DCiΦ∗(ζ1i) + (1−DCi)(1− Φ∗(ζ1i)] fζ1i(ζ1i|Γ,DCi,x1i,x2i) dζ1i
where
Φ∗ = Φ
(
x′2iγ + (ρ/σ)ζ1i√
1− ρ2
)
and fζ1i(ζ1i|Γ,DCi,x1i,x2i) is normal with mean zero and variance σ2, now if
we use the change of variable ξi = ζ1i/(σ
√
2)
we obtain that
(13) f(Vi,DCi|Γ,x1i,x2i) = 1√
π
∫
∞
−∞
f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ξiσ
√
2)×
×
[
DCiΦ
∗
i (ξiσ
√
2) + (1−DCi)(1− Φ∗(ξiσ
√
2)
]
exp(−ξ2i ) dξi
Where Γ = Γv ∪ {γ, σ, ρ} is the set of parameters and like in the basic count
model different specifications of f(Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ξiσ
√
2) derivate in different types
of models i.e. we can specify a Poisson distribution or a Negative Binomial dis-
tribution, Γ can be estimated using the Full Information Maximum Log likelihood
method (FIML) maximizing the following log likelihood function
ℓ(Γ) =
N∑
i=1
ln f(Vi,DCi|Γ,x1i,x2i)
In the case of Poisson we have that
(14) f
(
Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ξiσ
√
2
)
=
exp(−λi + ξiσ
√
2)(λi + ξiσ
√
2)Vi
Vi!
where as before λi = exp(θDCi + x
′
1iβ) and Γv = (δ, β, σ) is the set of parameters.
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In the case of a NB distribution we have that
(15) f
(
Vi|Γv,x1i,DCi, ξiσ
√
2
)
=
Γ(α−1 + Vi)
Γ(α−1)Γ(1 + Vi)
×
×
(
α−1
α−1 + λi + ξiσ
√
2
)α−1(
λi
α−1 + λi + ξiσ
√
2
)Vi
where as before λi = exp(θDCi+x
′
1iβ) and Γv = (α, δ, β, σ) is the set of param-
eters.
5. The Study Data
As we have seen in the mathematical framework, we need data about six groups
of variables the; endogenous variables (health care demand and duplicate cover-
age), individual characteristics (A), income (Y ), pre-treatment health status (h),
previous health status (h0), the likelihood occurrence of health shocks (Occupation
and others).
We use a sub-sample of people, who are older than 16 years, this sub-sample is
estimated to be 10,327 observations All variables used in our study are listed in
Table 2.
For measuring the demand of healthcare, we use the number of doctor visits
in the last 3 months (VISITS), unfortunately with the data available, it is not
possinble to classify whether these visits had been made to general practitioner or
to specialist. We create a dummy variable for the duplicate coverage; 1 if individual
has duplicate coverage and 0 if not
For estimating income, we use the household monthly net income (INC) mea-
sured in Euros. Given the reality that, the level of income in the West Germany is
higher than the Eastern Germany, and the income of household has to be distributed
over the household members. We include the geographic regions (REGION); (West
Germany) and the number of members in the household
For measuring the health status, we use the self-reported health status (HEA)
in 2005 (how individual would evaluate their health status on an ordinal scale) and
the existence of disability (DISAB) for the same year. In the case of the previous
health status we use self-reported health status (HEA0) for 2004 and two additional
variables that we expect to be related to the overall health status; the first one is
the physical condition of the individual (PHYS) and the second one is the mental
health status (PRESSED)6.
For the ndividual characteristics we include 3 variables; the gender of the individ-
ual (GENDER), the age (AGE, AGE2=AGE2) and for the education level we used
the education level with respect to High School (EDUHS). Finally we use four vari-
ables to analyze the impact of the risk; first we use only two occupational categories
(Blue collars and White collars), we use too a variable to identify the head of the
household (PRI), another one for the level of education of the head (EDUHSPRI)
and one variable that represents the level of physical activity (PHYS).
6Unfortunately PRESSED and PHYS are only available in the new module of health that
introduced by the (SOEP) in 2002 and has been revised and put into a two year replication period
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Table 2. Summary of variables
Dependent
DC 0 without and 1 if duplicated coverage.
VISITS number of visits in the last 3 months.
Income
INC Income categories, the dummy variables are:
0-1000 (1, omitted), 1000-1500 (2), 1500-2000 (3),
2000-3000 (4), 3000-4000 (5), 4000,... (6).
WG 1 for West Germany and 0 for East Germany.
NHH Number of members in the Household
Health
HEA Health Status (2005), the dummy variables are:
(hea1, omitted) Very good,(hea2) Good,
(hea3) Satisfactory, (hea4) Poor or bad.
DISAB 0 without and 1 if there is present disability.
Individual Characteristics
GENDER 1 for females and 0 for males.
AGE years divided by 100.
EDUHS Education With Respect to High School
, the dummy variables are:
(1, omitted) Less than H S,
(2) High School, (3) More than H S
Risk likelihood
PRI 1 for head of household and 0 i.a.c.
EDUHSPRI Education level of the head ,
the dummy variables are:
(1, omitted) Less than H S,
(2) High School, (3) More than H S
OCCUP Occupation, the dummy variables are:
Blue collars , White collars , Others( omitted).
SPORT Frequency of sport or exercise (Almost never or never 1
Several times a year 2,At least once a month 3,
At least once a week 4)
Previous Health Status
HEA0 Health Status (2004), the dummy variables are:
(hea1, omitted) Very good,(hea2) Good,
(hea3) Satisfactory, (hea4) Poor or bad.
PRESSED Pressed for time in the last 4 Weeks ( Always 1,
Often 2, Sometimes 3, Almost Never 4, Never 5)
PHYS Strong Physical Pain in the last 4 Weeks ( Always 1,
Often 2, Sometimes 3, Almost Never 4, Never 5)
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6. Results
In this section we present the results of the study. Our analytical strategy is to
estimate different types pf models and compare them. First we estimate a Poisson
and a Negative Binomial models to explain the number of visits to the doctor in
last three months (V), in both cases we use as explanatory variables; the duplicate
coverage (DC), income variables (INC2-6, WG, NHH), health variables (HEA2-4,
DISAB, PRESSED, PHYS) and (GENDER, AGE, AGE2, AGE SQR, EDUHS2,
EDUHS3).
We also estimate a Probit model to explain the Duplicate Coverage index (DC)
depending on income variables (INC2-6, WG, NHH), previous health variables
(HEA02-04, PRESSED, PHYS), variables of individual characteristics (GENDER,
AGE, AGE2, AGE SQR, EDUHS2, EDUHS3) and variables related to the likeli-
hood occurrence of health shocks (PRI, EDUHSPRI2-3, BLUE CO, WHITE CO,
SPORT). Finally, we estimate Endogenous Switching model using a Poisson distri-
bution taking in account the same variables as were used in the count and Probit
models.
The Table 3 presents the whole results of the used models; Poisson, Negative
Binomial model (NB) and the ES, additionally we present an auxiliary probit re-
gression , which used to compare the impact on DC in different scenarios the first
one (probit) without considering the correlation between the duplicate coverage
(DC) and the number of visit to the doctor (VISITS) and the second scenario
under the ES model.
A general view at table (3) shows that, only for some specific cases, the results
are quite similar in terms of significance and in the major of the cases in the sign
and value of the parameters. The first aspect; we observe a positive impact of
the duplicate coverage (DC) on the demand for visit to doctor (VISITS), in
the three models we notice significance, but under ES. this effect becomes greater,
the second important aspect, is the significance of ρ = −.615, which means; there
is feedback between the duplicate coverage and the demand, means the DC is
endogenous.
Analyzing the impact of the personal characteristics; GENDER, reflects a posi-
tive impact on VISITS and on DC also, in the case of AGE we only notice an U
impact on VISITS. The level of education of the individual has no effect on VISITS.
A positive effect has been found in the level of educaction on the (DC), this can
be explained by the tendency that, more educated look for more health services
quality (such as shorter waiting times and some luxury hospital services).
The Income variables show an expected effect. In the case of INC, the effect has
no notorious U impact on VISITS, this is harmoneous with the reality that richer
people have access to best health services have a better disposition to improve their
health easier. On other side, INC has an expected impact on DC, that means higher
income more insurance purchase, The variables WG and NHH in the ES. model
provides an intuitive result, meaning that, WG has a positive effect on the DC but
not on the VISITS, while NHH has an effect on both.
For analyzing the impact of the current health status, we use the variable (HEA),
its on VISITS is the expected, meaning that, less health leads more VISITS, we in-
clude too two more variables; PRESSED and PHY, we assume that, these variables
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Table 3. Health care estimations (n= 10,327)
MODEL NB2 POIS ES ES PROBIT
VISITS VISITS VISITS DC DC
DC 0.112* 0.116* 0.739*
GENDER 0.078* 0.072* 0.077* 0.086* 0.094*
AGE -1.008* -0.801* -0.946* 0.088 0.204
AGE SQR 0.954* 0.749* 1.008* -0.408 -0.497
EDUHS2 -0.015 -0.015 -0.037 0.342* 0.347*
EDUHS3 0.002 -0.002 -0.025 0.377* 0.370*
INC2 0.087* 0.103* 0.068* 0.238* 0.242*
INC3 0.093* 0.101* 0.077* 0.357* 0.403*
INC4 0.071 0.076 0.038 0.609* 0.632*
INC5 0.037 0.048 -0.015 0.760* 0.782*
INC6 -0.012 -0.009 -0.136* 1.058* 1.081*
WG 0.083* 0.093* 0.026 0.357 0.410*
NHH 0.001 0.000 0.024* -0.128* -0.130*
HEA2 0.122* 0.117* 0.127*
HEA3 0.383* 0.381* 0.375*
HEA4 0.913* 0.911* 0.881*
DISAB 0.247* 0.243* 0.268*
PRESSED -0.015 -0.018 -0.007 -0.063* -0.060*
PHYS -0.050* -0.049* -0.050* 0.013 0.013
HEA02 -0.075 -0.047
HEA03 -0.053 -0.020
HEA04 0.030 0.027
PRI 0.121* 0.110*
EDUHSPRI2 0.060 0.106
EDUHSPRI3 0.148 0.211*
BLUE CO -0.168* -0.121*
WHITE CO -0.069 -0.040
SPORT 0.121* 0.110*
CONS 1.053* 1.010* 0.801* -2.127* -2.297*
ALPHA 0.290*
SIGMA 0.587*
RHO -0.615*
∗ significant at 5%
are related to the kind of services that the duplicate insurance covers 7. Results
show that PRESSED has no impact on the number of visits.
We see that the previous general level of health (HEA0, PHYS) doesn’t have any
impact on the duplicate coverage, the reason is quite simple, if we suppose that, the
health status is really bad you expect to go a lot to doctors, therefore, purchasing
health insurance will be a good choice.
7Unfortunately these variables are only available for 2002, 2004, and 2006. So, we use the
values of 2004 for PRESSED and PHYS
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Generally, many of health problems are covered by the compulsory system, so,
it is expected that HEA0 doesn’t have any impact on DC, but this is not the case
with PRESSED that is more related with the type of diseases that DC covers.
Finally, we discuss the impact of the likelihood of health shocks on DC, like in the
case of the variables of the initial health status it is important take into account that,
DC does not cover every kind of diseases, instead DC covers only small problems
that are not covered by the compulsory system. PRI shows positive impact, because
the head in the majority of the cases takes the decision of purchasing additional
insurance. On other side, the negative impact of BLUE CO is explained by the
fact that duplicate coverage in Germany cover services like glasses and Blue collars
are less exposed to such needs. The positive effect of SPORTS could be explained
by the prediction that; intesive exercises lead to more health damage, which needs
speciliazed healthcare, or that; DC might cover sport programms.
7. Discussion
Using count data models, the determinants of the demand for medical services
as measured by the number of visits to physicians (general practitioners and spe-
cialists) in one quarter are estimated, the results show that the duplicate coverage
have a positive impact in the demand for healths services, the acquisition of a du-
plicate coverage increase the number of visits. Our empirical results emphasize the
importance of health status and the duplicate coverage insurance as determinants
of health-care demand, and the higher importance of the income variables over the
choice of duplicate coverage policies.
On the basis of the a count data model estimated using the FIML methodology
we found enough evidence for reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in the choice of
duplicate coverage respect to the use of health services.
Possible improves to this work can get it in two ways: i) by improving the quality
of the variables representing the previous health (h0) and ii) by implementing a ES
model using a negative binomial distributions instead of the Poisson distribution
that is used in this work.
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